

NATIONAL CULTURE AND THE ASSET GROWTH EFFECT: INSIGHTS FROM THE OVERINVESTMENT HYPOTHESIS

Robin K. Chou

Department of Finance, National Chengchi University
Risk and Insurance Research Center, National Chengchi University

Kuan-Cheng Ko

Department of Banking and Finance, National Chi Nan University

S. Ghon Rhee

Shidler College of Business, University of Hawai'i

INTRODUCTION

◎ Asset Growth Effect

- Negative corporate investment-return relation
- U.S. evidence: Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003); Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004); Anderson and Garcia-Feijóo (2006); Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008)
- International evidence: Titman, Wei, and Xie (2013); Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu (2013)

INTRODUCTION

◎ Possible Explanations

- Overinvestment hypothesis (Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004)
- Limits-to-arbitrage (Li and Zhang, 2010; Lipson, Mortal, and Schill, 2011)
- Q-theory (Lam and Wei, 2011; Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2013; Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu, 2013)

INTRODUCTION

◎ How to distinguish the explanations in international equity markets?

- Market development (q-theory versus overinvestment)
- Market efficiency (q-theory versus limits-to-arbitrage)
- Investor protection, corporate governance, accounting quality (alternative forms of mispricing)

INTRODUCTION

- ◎ National cultures and asset growth effect
 - Managerial overconfidence enhances overinvestment
 - Uncertainty avoidance mitigates overinvestment
 - The two psychological dimensions serve as proxies for the overinvestment hypothesis
- ◎ Individualism and uncertainty avoidance proxy for overinvestment!

TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

◎H1: Managerial overconfidence enhances overinvestment

- Asset growth effect is stronger in individualistic cultures

◎H2: Uncertainty avoidance mitigates overinvestment

- Asset growth effect is stronger low uncertainty-avoiding cultures

TESTABLE HYPOTHESES

- ◎H3: National cultures surpass market development and efficiency in explaining asset growth effect
 - Cross-sectional regressions to compare alternative explanations simultaneously

DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTIONS

- ◎ A sample consisting of all common listed stocks from 41 countries over 1982-2013
 - Monthly market and accounting data for international markets are obtained from the Datastream International database
 - U.S. data are obtained from CRSP and Compustat
 - Country-level individualism and uncertainty avoidance indices are obtained from Hofstede (1980, 2001) and Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010)

DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTIONS

◎ Measurement of asset growth:

$$TAG_{i,t} \equiv \frac{TA_{i,t-1} - TA_{i,t-2}}{TA_{i,t-2}}$$

◎ Variable constructions are the same with Fama and French (1992)

- We also consider firm size, book-to-market ratio, and past returns in Fama-MacBeth regressions

◎ Returns are converted into U.S. dollars

INDIVIDUALISM AND ASSET GROWTH ANOMALY

	Equally-weighted returns			Value-weighted returns		
IDV	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10
Low	1.202 *** (3.10)	0.966 ** (2.27)	0.236 (1.43)	0.732 * (1.92)	0.844 * (1.89)	-0.113 (-0.60)
Median	1.347 *** (3.68)	0.997 ** (2.48)	0.350 * (1.92)	1.149 *** (2.94)	0.992 ** (2.32)	0.157 (0.74)
High	1.033 *** (2.85)	0.283 (0.75)	0.750 *** (5.66)	1.037 *** (3.15)	0.404 (1.10)	0.633 *** (3.73)
High-Low	-0.169 (-0.57)	-0.683 ** (-2.21)	0.514 *** (2.60)	0.305 (1.03)	-0.441 (-1.40)	0.745 *** (3.02)

INDIVIDUALISM AND ASSET GROWTH ANOMALY

	Equally-weighted returns			Value-weighted returns		
UAI	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10
Low	1.306 *** (3.39)	0.683 * (1.66)	0.624 *** (4.96)	1.112 *** (2.96)	0.489 (1.17)	0.624 *** (3.80)
Median	1.131 *** (3.35)	0.558 (1.44)	0.573 *** (4.03)	0.805 ** (2.50)	0.654 * (1.67)	0.151 (0.80)
High	1.120 *** (3.18)	0.996 *** (2.70)	0.124 (0.63)	1.011 *** (2.69)	1.079 *** (2.69)	-0.069 (-0.29)
High-Low	-0.187 (-0.74)	0.313 (1.23)	-0.500 ** (-2.34)	-0.102 (-0.39)	0.591 ** (2.27)	-0.692 ** (-2.53)

ROBUSTNESS

◎ Our results are robust to

- The exclusion of the U.S. market
- Subperiods partitioned by 1999
- Denomination in local currencies

FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR OVERINVESTMENT

	Equally-weighted returns			Value-weighted returns		
	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10
Low debt ratio						
Low IDV	1.092 *** (3.18)	1.177 *** (2.76)	-0.085 (-0.44)	0.571 (1.61)	0.938 ** (2.12)	-0.368 (-1.65)
Median IDV	1.328 *** (3.46)	0.778 * (1.88)	0.550 ** (2.49)	1.202 *** (2.98)	0.597 (1.42)	0.606 ** (2.25)
High IDV	1.124 *** (2.81)	0.291 (0.67)	0.833 *** (4.14)	0.712 * (1.79)	0.192 (0.43)	0.520 ** (2.23)
High-Low	0.032 (0.11)	-0.886 ** (-2.52)	0.918 *** (3.62)	0.141 (0.42)	-0.747 ** (-2.01)	0.888 *** (2.96)
Median debt ratio						
Low IDV	1.483 *** (3.41)	1.151 *** (2.62)	0.331 (1.64)	1.207 *** (2.70)	1.002 ** (2.17)	0.204 (0.92)
Median IDV	1.220 *** (2.91)	0.805 * (1.91)	0.415 * (1.68)	1.232 *** (2.92)	0.842 * (1.94)	0.389 (1.41)
High IDV	0.978 *** (2.76)	0.362 (0.96)	0.616 *** (3.97)	1.023 *** (2.86)	0.617 (1.59)	0.407 ** (2.30)
High-Low	-0.505 (-1.40)	-0.790 ** (-2.44)	0.285 (1.13)	-0.184 (-0.49)	-0.386 (-1.15)	0.202 (0.77)
High debt ratio						
Low IDV	0.962 ** (2.10)	1.033 ** (2.29)	-0.071 (-0.30)	0.833 * (1.72)	0.988 ** (2.12)	-0.155 (-0.58)
Median IDV	0.811 ** (2.10)	0.670 (1.50)	0.141 (0.52)	0.758 * (1.76)	0.579 (1.19)	0.179 (0.56)
High IDV	0.794 ** (2.12)	0.166 (0.45)	0.628 *** (4.07)	0.673 ** (1.99)	0.430 (1.16)	0.244 (1.33)
High-Low	-0.168 (-0.45)	-0.867 ** (-2.49)	0.699 ** (2.53)	-0.159 (-0.41)	-0.558 (-1.64)	0.399 (1.24)

FURTHER EVIDENCE FOR OVERINVESTMENT

	Equally-weighted returns			Value-weighted returns		
	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10	AG1	AG10	AG1-AG10
<i>Low debt ratio</i>						
Low UAI	1.377 *** (3.49)	0.754 * (1.75)	0.623 *** (3.45)	0.931 ** (2.44)	0.345 (0.81)	0.586 *** (2.83)
Median UAI	1.037 *** (2.96)	0.539 (1.23)	0.499 ** (2.30)	0.633 * (1.71)	0.430 (0.95)	0.203 (0.79)
High UAI	1.180 *** (3.27)	0.935 ** (2.52)	0.245 (1.01)	0.985 *** (2.64)	0.942 ** (2.38)	0.043 (0.17)
High-Low	-0.197 (-0.77)	0.181 (0.66)	-0.378 (-1.39)	0.054 (0.20)	0.597 ** (2.12)	-0.543 * (-1.83)
<i>Median debt ratio</i>						
Low UAI	1.452 *** (3.56)	0.725 * (1.74)	0.727 *** (4.22)	1.318 *** (3.23)	0.759 * (1.72)	0.560 ** (2.55)
Median UAI	1.147 *** (2.93)	0.426 (1.05)	0.721 *** (3.24)	1.010 *** (2.61)	0.488 (1.24)	0.521 ** (2.13)
High UAI	1.083 *** (3.09)	1.170 *** (3.11)	-0.087 (-0.40)	1.140 *** (3.02)	1.212 *** (2.93)	-0.073 (-0.29)
High-Low	-0.369 (-1.35)	0.445 * (1.76)	-0.814 *** (-3.32)	-0.179 (-0.60)	0.454 (1.49)	-0.632 ** (-2.02)
<i>High debt ratio</i>						
Low UAI	1.011 ** (2.36)	0.762 * (1.82)	0.249 (1.20)	0.970 ** (2.26)	0.793 * (1.85)	0.178 (0.80)
Median UAI	0.872 ** (2.35)	0.390 (0.99)	0.482 ** (2.44)	0.689 * (1.79)	0.416 (1.01)	0.273 (1.08)
High UAI	0.732 ** (2.01)	0.705 * (1.73)	0.028 (0.11)	0.656 (1.63)	0.756 * (1.70)	-0.100 (-0.35)
High-Low	-0.279 (-1.02)	-0.058 (-0.19)	-0.222 (-0.71)	-0.315 (-1.04)	-0.037 (-0.12)	-0.278 (-0.87)

FAMA-MACBETH REGRESSIONS

Variable	Individualism (IDV)			
	Low	Median	High	High-Low
$\ln(1+TAG)$	-0.180 (-1.19)	-0.139 (-0.92)	-0.586*** (-6.14)	-0.406** (-2.45)
$\ln SIZE$	-0.153*** (-3.39)	-0.145*** (-2.86)	-0.040 (-1.06)	0.114* (1.97)
$\ln BM$	0.130** (2.43)	0.050 (1.19)	0.026*** (2.71)	-0.105* (-1.93)
$PRET$	-0.151 (-0.58)	-0.063 (-0.36)	0.617*** (4.25)	0.768*** (2.95)

FAMA-MACBETH REGRESSIONS CONTROLLING FOR OTHER EFFECTS

Variable	Uncertainty avoidance (UAI)			
	Low	Median	High	High-Low
$\ln(1+TAG)$	-0.585 *** (-5.57)	-0.477 *** (-5.08)	0.019 (0.13)	0.603 *** (3.66)
$\ln SIZE$	-0.073 * (-1.72)	-0.122 *** (-3.30)	-0.128 *** (-2.94)	-0.055 (-0.87)
$\ln BM$	0.001 (0.03)	0.020 ** (2.30)	0.080 * (1.66)	0.079 (1.33)
$PRET$	0.424 ** (2.25)	0.487 ** (2.56)	-0.275 (-1.26)	-0.699 *** (-3.06)

CONTROLS OF ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL-WIDE INDICES

◎Market development of Titman, Wei, and Xie (2013)

- Developed market (DEVP), Access-to-equity market index (EQUITY), Market-cap-to-GDP ratio (MKTCAP), and Ratio of value traded to GDP (LIQUID)

◎Market efficiency of Watanabe, Xu, Yao, and Yu (2013)

- Stock return synchronicity (R^2), Importance of stock market (MKT), and Future earnings response coefficient (FERC)

CONTROLLING FOR MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND EFFICIENCY

Model	IDV	UAI	DEVP	EQUITY	MKTCAP	LIQUID	R ²	MKT	FERC
Panel A: Univariate regressions									
Equal weights	1.155 *** (3.58)	-0.895 ** (-2.37)	0.528 ** (2.32)	0.489 ** (2.16)	0.002 (0.91)	0.003 * (1.68)	-3.842 ** (-2.31)	0.008 * (1.66)	0.426 ** (2.45)
Value weights	1.213 *** (2.96)	-1.281 *** (-2.87)	0.666 ** (2.42)	0.453 * (1.84)	0.001 (0.37)	-0.001 (-0.52)	-6.051 *** (-3.19)	0.006 (0.97)	0.326 (1.41)
Panel B: Asset growth portfolios formed on equal weights									
Model 1	1.028 *** (3.25)	-0.673 * (-1.81)							
Model 2	1.233 *** (3.04)	-0.587 (-1.61)	-0.060 (-0.21)						
Model 3	0.966 ** (2.14)	-0.485 (-1.34)		0.253 (0.84)					
Model 4	1.179 *** (3.49)	-0.735 ** (-2.03)			-0.001 (-0.69)				
Model 5	0.980 *** (2.96)	-0.611 * (-1.65)				0.002 (1.12)			
Model 6	1.044 ** (2.33)	-0.614 (-1.64)					-0.880 (-0.38)		
Model 7	1.237 *** (3.78)	-0.465 (-1.28)						0.002 (0.42)	
Model 8	0.889 *** (2.75)	-0.622 (-1.61)							0.255 (1.39)
Panel C: Asset growth portfolios formed on value weights									
Model 1	1.058 *** (2.61)	-1.103 ** (-2.49)							
Model 2	1.032 ** (2.11)	-1.073 ** (-2.55)	0.121 (0.34)						
Model 3	1.466 *** (2.82)	-1.239 *** (-2.92)		-0.024 (-0.07)					
Model 4	1.310 *** (3.19)	-1.437 *** (-3.32)			-0.004 (-1.65)				
Model 5	1.117 *** (2.67)	-1.300 *** (-3.06)				-0.002 (-1.16)			
Model 6	0.860 * (1.68)	-0.978 ** (-2.17)					-3.548 (-1.41)		
Model 7	1.382 *** (3.47)	-1.152 *** (-2.62)						-0.003 (-0.48)	
Model 8	0.997 ** (2.33)	-1.192 *** (-2.60)							0.191 (0.76)

CONTROLLING FOR ALTERNATIVE INDICES

											Legal origin			
	TCOST	IRISK	DVOL	SHORT	CR	AD	AS	ACCT	EMS	UK	FR	GE	SC	
Multivariate regressions														
IDV	1.612 ***	1.064 ***	1.176 **	1.308 ***	1.201 ***	1.212 ***	1.056 **	1.633 ***	1.312 **				1.110 ***	
	(3.33)	(2.60)	(2.32)	(2.76)	(2.91)	(2.77)	(2.53)	(3.98)	(2.32)				(2.65)	
UAI	-1.022 **	-0.953 **	-1.100 **	-0.915 **	-1.338 ***	-1.121 **	-1.511 ***	-1.404 ***	-0.992 **				-1.049 *	
	(-2.29)	(-2.15)	(-2.21)	(-2.07)	(-3.04)	(-2.43)	(-3.17)	(-3.04)	(-2.35)				(-1.69)	
Control	0.002	0.175	0.000	-0.293	-0.136	0.112	-0.638	-0.017	0.009	0.286	-0.246	0.393	-0.038	
	(0.44)	(1.40)	(0.26)	(-0.90)	(-1.34)	(0.66)	(-1.55)	(-0.93)	(0.49)	(0.81)	(-0.43)	(0.81)	(-0.10)	

CONCLUSIONS

- ◎ We establish the linkage between national cultures and the asset growth effect
 - Overinvestment as the underlying channel
- ◎ Asset growth premia are significant in countries with
 - High individualism
 - Low uncertainty avoidance

CONCLUSIONS

- ◎ National cultures dominate proxies of q-theory and limits-to-arbitrage in explaining the asset growth anomaly across countries